Publications in Peer-Reviewed Journals
Economics Letters, 2015
We find a more negative impact of a financial crisis on growth of industrial sectors in developed countries that are more dependent on external finance, also when controlling for omitted variables by including country–time, industry–time and country–industry fixed effects. This differential effect is stronger in countries with a more leveraged financial sector, while it is unaffected by the depth of financial markets.
Games and Economic Behavior, 2014
We consider a dynamic competition game involving three players, in which each player can vary the extent of his competition on a per-rival basis. We call such competition targeted. We show that if the players are myopic, then the weaker players eventually lose the game to their strongest rival. If instead the players are sufficiently far-sighted, then all three players converge in their power and stay in the game. We develop our model in application to drug wars, but the approach of targeted competition can be applied to competition between firms or political parties, or to warfare.
Games and Economic Behavior, 2012
We consider an oligopolistic market where firms compete in price and quality and where consumers have heterogeneous information: some consumers know both the prices, and quality of the products offered, some know only the prices, and some know neither. We show that if there are sufficiently many uninformed consumers, then there exists a unique equilibrium where price is a perfect indicator of quality. This equilibrium is characterized by dispersion and Pareto-inefficiency of the price/quality offers, where better price/quality combinations are associated with lower prices.